



CHILDREN'S
RIGHTS
WATCH

CHILDREN UNDER FIRE

An analysis of the global impact of airstrikes on children
based on data gathered by Children's Rights Watch from
November 2025 to April 2026

Thick smoke and flames erupt from an Israeli airstrike in Gaza City, Sunday, June 1, 2025. (AP Photo/Jehad Alshrafi)

Contents

About Children's Rights Watch	3
Methodology	4
Executive Summary	5
01 Overview of Airstrike Incidents <i>Six months. eleven countries. One consistent pattern.</i>	8
02 Airstrikes and Child Casualties by Country <i>A comparative analysis of child casualty rates across eleven conflict zones.</i>	13
03 Conflict Actors and Child Casualties <i>A comparative analysis of airstrike perpetrators by incident frequency, child casualty rates, and accountability outcomes.</i>	19
04 Drone Warfare: Proliferation and Civilian Harm <i>How a weapons technology proliferated beyond state militaries — with lethal consequences for children.</i>	22
05 Recommendations <i>The documentation is done. Here is what must change.</i>	28
06 Conclusion <i>375 children. eleven conflict zones. No completed legal accountability</i>	31
Appendix — Full Incident Data	33

Children's Rights Watch

Children's Rights Watch (CRW) is an independent non-profit project based in Lisbon, Portugal, dedicated to investigating, documenting, and reporting on the effects of war and armed conflict on children.

CRW gathers information from open sources on incidents affecting children in armed conflict zones around the world. These incidents are investigated and systematically documented in a growing incident database designed to identify patterns of harm and better understand how war affects children.

Our methodology is grounded in the documentation of individual, unique incidents — each dateable, geolocatable, and verified against open-source evidence. CRW does not use aggregated statistics as the basis for its analysis. Every incident in this report represents a specific event, in a specific place, on a specific date, affecting real children. Hence, why the incident and casualties' number are usually lower than available aggregated data.

CRW operates without affiliation to any armed group, government, political party, or foreign power. Our documentation covers all conflict parties and all conflict zones without distinction. No child casualty is treated as more or less worthy of documentation based on the identity of the perpetrator or the geopolitical significance of the conflict.

Our mission is to ensure that children's suffering in war is neither ignored nor forgotten — and that accurate, verified information drives accountability, advocacy, and change.

We welcome collaboration, verified information, and inquiries from journalists, researchers, humanitarian organisations, and institutions working on children's rights and international humanitarian law.

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CHILDREN'S
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Lisbon, Portugal

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How CRW Collects, Verifies and Records Data

All data derives exclusively from open sources. Every incident is unique, dateable, geolocatable, and verified. CRW does not conduct field investigations.

KEY DEFINITIONS

Child	Any person under the age of 18 (UNCRC, Article 1).
Airstrike	Attack delivered from an aerial platform — crewed or uncrewed. Sea- and ground-launched missiles are excluded.
Incident	A unique event with a confirmed date and location, not spanning more than 48 hours.

1. Data Collection

A Python script runs daily across multilingual sources using keywords such as "children killed", "UXO AND children", paired with conflict-specific terms. Results are reviewed manually.

Non-English sources are AI-translated; ambiguous translations are cross-referenced. Social media (X/Twitter, Telegram, Instagram) is monitored for incidents not covered by traditional media, particularly in high-blackout environments (North Kordofan, Sagaing).

2. Incident Selection

An incident is recorded when: (1) at least one child is killed, injured, displaced, kidnapped, detained or victim of any other form of violence within the setting on an armed

4. Casualties & Infrastructure

A victim is recorded as a child only when explicitly described as such or when an age under 18 is stated.

Adult casualties in incidents where children are impacted are recorded to assess full humanitarian scale. Infrastructure damage is recorded by type — residential, health, educational, humanitarian — when clearly stated in the source.

5. Scope — This Report

88 verified airstrike incidents across 11 conflict zones, November 2025 – April 2026: Afghanistan, Iran, Lebanon, Mali, Myanmar, Nigeria, the occupied Palestinian territory, Syria, South Sudan, Sudan, and Ukraine.

conflict or as direct/indirect consequence of an armed conflict; (2) the date is confirmed; (3) the location is identifiable up to at least the province or city; (4) at least one credible source confirms it. Unknown child casualty figures are recorded pending follow-up. Incidents with adult casualties only are not recorded.

3. Perpetrators

A perpetrator is recorded where they have claimed responsibility or are clearly identified in the source. Where sources conflict, the most credible attribution is recorded, and the dispute noted.

6. Limitations

Under-reporting: figures are minimum confirmed counts; high-blackout environments are substantially under-represented.

Reporting lag: incidents may not surface for 2–3 weeks in blackout zones.

Injury-to-death: casualties recorded as injured may subsequently have died.

Attribution: contested attributions recorded to the most credible source; independent verification is not possible.

Aggregated data: reports covering multiple undifferentiated events over more than 48 hours are excluded.



A bloodied Palestinian child standing in the ruins in the aftermath of an Israeli bombardment, Gaza, Palestine, Oct. 25, 2023. (AA Photo)

Executive Summary

Airstrikes were the deadliest documented form of violence against children in CRW's dataset during the reporting period

For many children, the sky is a place of wonder. In large cities, they may see a vast darkness broken by the occasional star and the distant sound of a helicopter. In more remote areas, they may look upward and see a sky filled with stars and galaxies. Others learn the constellations, giving them names and stories.

For children living amid armed conflict, the sky can mean something entirely different. In places such as Palestine, Lebanon and Sudan, the sound of a jet engine or the sight of an aircraft overhead can trigger fear, panic, stress and trauma.

This is one of the human consequences of airstrikes: the transformation of the sky from a source of wonder into a source of fear.



© AFP / A young girl rides a bicycle among the debris of houses destroyed after an attack in the town of Dobropillya, in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine, on June 15, 2022.

Airstrikes pose one of the greatest threats to children and civilians in armed conflict, **particularly when explosive weapons are used in populated areas**. Airstrikes accounted for 49,15% of documented child deaths recorded by CRW across the eleven conflict locations during the reporting period. Children's Rights Watch (CRW) documented 88 distinct incidents of airstrikes that resulted in child casualties. From November 2025 to April 2026, **375 children were killed by airstrikes alone**.


In the last 6 months, from November 2025 to April 2026, CRW identified and confirmed 88 distinct incidents where children were killed by airstrikes in armed conflict locations around the world, the most recurring form of violence against children by number of incidents and number of victims, according to CRW data.

These 88 incidents resulted in the deaths of 375 children and 814 adults, plus at least 83 children and 507 adults suffering direct injuries, very likely creating lifelong injuries and incapacities. The average age of children victimised by airstrikes was 7.8 years old. Where ages were documented, the youngest confirmed victim was a newborn under one year old. More than **31%** of children with documented ages **were under five years old at the time they were killed.**

CRW's definition of an airstrike follows the framework established in AOAV's Anatomy of an Airstrike (2022), which defines an airstrike as the delivery of weapons from an aircraft. Under this definition, CRW includes attacks carried out by jets, bombers, helicopters, drones, and loitering munitions — all of which constitute aerial platforms. Systems launched from ground or naval platforms, including cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and artillery, are excluded regardless of guidance capability or civilian harm caused.

For the analysed period, data gathered by CRW shows that **49,15%** of all recorded child deaths across all armed conflict locations analysed, were caused by airstrikes, followed by missile strikes, which represented 22.54% of child casualties.

Child Casualties by Cause of Harm



Data gathered by Children's Rights Watch from November 2025 to April 2026 displaying the number of child casualties by direct cause of harm. Graphic generated from CRW Incident Database via Power BI.



CHAPTER 1

Overview of the Documented Airstrike Incidents

According to CRW data, airstrikes were the deadliest documented form of violence against children in armed conflict — and residential areas are where they strike most.

An Israeli airstrike hitting residential buildings in the Tuffah neighbourhood of eastern Gaza City - Mohammed Saber | European Pressphoto Agency (EPA)

Overview of Airstrike Incidents

Airstrikes were the deadliest documented form of violence against children in CRW's dataset — and residential areas are where they strike most



A series of deadly attacks across Ukraine killed three children and injured 19 in Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk and Kharkiv in November 2025

**88**

Verified incidents involving child fatalities in the past 6 months.

**375**

Children were killed, and over **83** were confirmed as injured.

**814**

Adult civilians were also killed in the same incidents.

**63,6%**

of airstrikes occurred in residential areas.

The data gathered by Children's Rights Watch shows that airstrikes consistently result in exceptionally high numbers of civilian, including child, casualties. By putting these numbers into perspective, CRW's documented incidents correspond to an average of approximately 2 child deaths per day during the reporting period.

By using the total number of civilian deaths in these 88 incidents documented, we reach a concerning number of 198 civilians killed every month by airstrikes in the past 6 months, or 6.6 per day. **Nearly 1200 civilian deaths in just 6 months, just from the airstrikes reported by CRW, the real number likely being exponentially higher.**

On average, each documented airstrike killed 4.3 children and 9.3 adults, illustrating the high lethality of air-delivered explosive weapons once civilians are caught within the blast area.

These numbers are aggravated by the fact that the vast majority of airstrikes occur in places where civilians either live, sleep, eat, work or go for health care. In the analysed incidents, **63.6%** of airstrikes were in residential areas, meaning in people's homes.

Airstrikes also occurred in humanitarian settings (11.4%), including refugee camps and support centres, in commercial facilities (8.0%), health care centres (2.3%), religious buildings (2.3%), and educational buildings (2.3%).

INFRASTRUCTURE AFFECTED	AIRSTRIKES (INCIDENTS)	CHILDREN KILLED	AVERAGE CHILDREN KILLED PER AIRSTRIKE
 Residential	56	176	3.1
 Educational	2	72	36.0
 Health Care	2	16	8.0
 Humanitarian	10	48	4.8
 Religious	2	19	9.5
 Commercial	7	22	3.1
 Transport	2	4	2.0

Data gathered by Children's Rights Watch from November 2025 to April 2026 displaying the number of airstrikes by their area of impact vs the number of child casualties in those same incidents and the average child casualty rate by type of location.

Although attacks on schools and healthcare facilities were less frequent, they proved exceptionally deadly. The two documented attacks on educational facilities killed 72 children — an average of 36 child deaths per incident — while two attacks on healthcare facilities killed 16 children and 89 adults. The data suggests that while residential areas bear the greatest cumulative burden because of the frequency of attacks, strikes affecting schools are, by far, the deadliest.

In Lebanon, 90.5% of airstrikes that led to the death or injury of children occurred in a residential setting. In Palestine, 52.2% occurred in a residential setting, while 26.1% targeted humanitarian infrastructure such as refugee camps or support centres. In Ukraine, where main cities such as Kyiv and Kharkiv are constantly the target of Russian air and missile strikes, 88.9% of airstrikes that resulted in the death or injury of a child occurred in a residential setting.

Studies from long-term monitoring of the effects of explosive weapons in populated areas demonstrate that the use of explosive weapons in populated areas results in disproportionately high civilian harm. This is mostly caused by wide-area effects of explosive weapons—including blast waves, fragmentation, structural collapse, and damage to critical infrastructure—which are amplified in densely populated urban environments. **Monitoring by Action on Armed Violence has found that approximately 90–95% of people killed or injured by explosive weapons in populated areas are civilians¹.**



Before and after pictures showing the aftermath of multiple IDF airstrikes against the Al-Atatra area of Beit Lahiya in northern Gaza. Satellite images by Maxar; Retrieved from The Guardian.

The use of explosive weapons in populated areas has particularly severe consequences for children due to their unique physical, psychological, and developmental vulnerabilities².


Due to their smaller bodies and developing organs, children are more susceptible to blast overpressure, fragmentation, burns, and crush injuries, and as such, more likely than adults to suffer life-altering injuries, including amputations, blindness, hearing loss, and traumatic brain injuries, while also experiencing profound psychological harm such as anxiety, post-traumatic stress, and disrupted cognitive development.

¹ *Explosive Violence Monitor: 2024 – Action on Armed Violence*. Published on 21/05/2025: <https://aoav.org.uk/2025/explosive-violence-monitor-2024/>

² *Explosive weapons in populated areas - The devastating effects of explosive weapons on children are wide-ranging and can reverberate long after conflict*. UNICEF: <https://www.unicef.org/take-action/campaigns/children-under-attack/explosive-weapons-populated-areas>

The findings presented in this report reinforce the established humanitarian evidence on explosive weapons in populated areas. Airstrikes consistently generated some of the highest child casualty rates recorded by Children's Rights Watch, particularly where explosive weapons were used against residential neighbourhoods and other civilian environments.

The combination of wide-area explosive effects and children's heightened vulnerability helps explain why airstrikes remain one of the deadliest forms of violence affecting children in contemporary armed conflict.



88 documented airstrike incidents across 11 conflict zones. Blue markers indicate confirmed incident locations. Map generated from CRW Incident Database via Power BI.



CHAPTER 2

Airstrikes and Child Casualties by Country

The scale and composition of civilian fatalities differ considerably between conflict locations — and where children bore the greatest share of the toll.

Satellite image: Al-Atatra area, Beit Lahiya, northern Gaza · 21 October 2023 · Maxar Technologies / The Guardian

Airstrikes and Child Casualties by Country

The scale and composition of civilian fatalities differ considerably between conflict locations — and where children bore the greatest share of the toll.

The scale and composition of civilian fatalities differ considerably between different armed conflict locations. Comparing child and adult fatalities by country provides a clearer understanding of where children bore the greatest share of the civilian death toll and highlights the varying humanitarian consequences of air-delivered explosive weapons.

Country	Documented Airstrikes (Incidents)	Children Killed	Adults Killed	Children as % of Civilian Fatalities	Child : Adult Ratio
 Afghanistan	3	31	8	● 79.5%	3.88 : 1
 Iran	2	6	5	● 54.5%	1.20 : 1
 Mali	4	11	13	● 45.8%	1 : 1.18
 South Sudan	1	11	15	● 42.3%	1 : 1.36
 Sudan	13	149	212	● 41.3%	1 : 1.42
 Palestine	23	45	65	● 40.9%	1 : 1.44
 Lebanon	21	64	110	● 36.8%	1 : 1.72
 Myanmar	10	37	112	● 24.8%	1 : 3.03
 Ukraine	9	18	74	● 19.6%	1 : 4.11

Data gathered by Children's Rights Watch from November 2025 to April 2026, showing the number of airstrikes, child casualties, adult casualties vs % of child casualties with adults and the child: adult ratio.

Although Sudan recorded the highest total number of child fatalities, Lebanon experienced a larger number of airstrikes, all conducted by the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), but with a lower average of child fatalities per incident. Afghanistan recorded the highest proportion of child fatalities among all countries analysed, **with children representing nearly 80% of all civilians killed in documented airstrikes** — a figure driven by Pakistan Air Force strikes on residential areas in Kunar and Khost provinces. Mali recorded a child share of 45.8% — driven by Malian Armed Forces drone strikes on Tuareg nomadic communities in the Tombouctou and Ségou regions.

In contrast, children accounted for around 42% of civilian fatalities in South Sudan, 41% in Sudan, and 41% in Palestine, and approximately 37% in Lebanon. Myanmar and Ukraine recorded the lowest proportions among the countries analysed, at **25%** and **20%** respectively. These patterns demonstrate that the impact of airstrikes on children is not uniform and depends on the specific characteristics of each conflict and the locations affected.

On 8 April 2026 — a day Lebanon would come to call Black Wednesday — the Israeli Defence Forces launched over 150 simultaneous strikes across the country in the space of ten minutes. Among the confirmed sub-incidents, five consecutive strikes on the densely populated Hay el Sellom neighbourhood of southern Beirut killed at least 18 children alone. **CRW documented at least 26 confirmed child deaths across verified sub-incidents, with UNICEF reporting a total of 33 children killed that day³** — making it one of the deadliest days for child casualties from airstrikes in the reporting period.

By the number of child casualties alone, Sudan was the most impacted country, with 149 children killed across just 13 documented strikes. Lebanon was the second most impacted, with 64 children killed across 21 incidents — less than half Sudan's toll despite a significantly higher number of documented strikes. Afghanistan, with only 3 documented incidents, recorded 31 child deaths — the third highest total, and the highest child fatality rate of any country in the dataset.



The conflict in Sudan, which has been ravaging the country since 2023, has created one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world, one that was only exacerbated by the amount of military technology and equipment that has been pouring into the country by foreign supporters of both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

The use of drones by both sides of the conflict has proven disastrous for civilians, who more often than not fall victim to these unrestrained attacks.

A building destroyed in Beirut on 8th of April 2026 following a series of IDF airstrikes. Photo by UNICEF

³ UNICEF statement on intensified strikes on Lebanon and the devastating impact on children – UNICEF: Published on 09/04/2026: <https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/unicef-statement-intensified-strikes-lebanon-and-devastating-impact-children>

According to data gathered by CRW, over **39% of child casualties caused by airstrikes occurred in Sudan**, and here, all were killed by drone strikes. In early December 2025, the RSF conducted a drone strike against a kindergarten in Kagoli (Kordofan State), killing 63 children and 51 adults, injuring hundreds more⁴.

On March 20th, 2026, the Sudanese Armed Forces launched a drone strike against the El-Daein Hospital in Darfur, killing over **70 civilians, including 15 children**⁵. SAF leadership initially described the strike as a mistake. The SAF subsequently claimed the hospital had been used as an RSF command centre — a claim that has not been independently verified.

On February 6th, 2026, the RSF launched a drone strike against a World Food Programme convoy that was transporting displaced people who had fled the fighting in the Dubeiker area. **The strike killed 24 people, including 8 children.** Several others were wounded and taken for treatment in Rahad, which was suffering severe medical supplies shortages, like many areas in the Kordofan region.



Damaged buildings after clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in South Khartoum, April 25, 2023 [Stringer/Reuters]

Sudan is the 3rd most impacted country when it comes to the number of airstrikes directly impacting children; however, the uncontrolled use of this tactic against civilian targets ravages a vast number of other countries. On the 22nd of February 2026, the

⁴ WHO says 114 killed in Thursday strikes on Sudan kindergarten, hospital – Alarabya English: <https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2025/12/08/who-says-114-killed-in-thursday-strikes-on-sudan-kindergarten-hospital>

⁵ Strike on Al-Jabalain hospital results in 10 fatalities, including seven medical staff – Médecins Sans Frontières; Published on 04/04/2026: <https://www.msf.org/sudan-strike-hospitals-results-10-fatalities-including-7-medical-staff>

Pakistani Air Force conducted multiple airstrikes⁶ in Afghanistan, specifically residential areas in the province of Behsood, which, according to Islamabad, are one of many terrorist hideouts belonging to the Pakistani Taliban and their affiliates, such as the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISKP). **During these attacks, at least 17 civilians and 11 children were killed.**

Myanmar, which is also facing a civil war since 2021 between the Military Junta, which took power in the 2021 coup and the Anti-Junta Resistance, has also suffered severely under the strain of airstrikes against civilians. Nearly 50 children were killed by Military Junta airstrikes during the reported period. On March 10th, 2026, multiple airstrikes in the Kawthoolei region of Karen State led **to the death of 18 children** and over 20 adult civilians⁷. In Myanmar, airstrikes are conducted by the Military Junta and mostly by combat aircraft, and the use of drones for these attacks, unlike conflict areas such as Sudan, is clearly still not mainstream.


Just as with most armed conflict locations analysed, in Myanmar, most airstrikes were conducted against villages, targeting residential areas and therefore causing a higher casualty rate of civilians and children.



children walking through the rubble after an Israeli military strike in the village of Douris, Lebanon. by photojournalist Nidal Solh for Agence France-Presse (AFP).

⁶ At least 17 killed, including eleven children, in the bombing of Pakistan in Afghanistan – SwissInfo. Published on 22/02/2026: <https://www.swissinfo.ch/spa/al-menos-17-muertos%2C-entre-ellos-once-ni%C3%B1os%2C-en-el-bombardeo-de-pakistan-en-afganistan%2C-190979035>

⁷ Eighteen children among dozens killed in Myanmar air strikes – The Telegraph. Posted on 13/03/2026: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2026/03/13/18-children-among-dozens-killed-in-myanmar-air-strike/>




Palestine / Gaza

Perpetrator: Israeli Defence Forces

45 children killed

Incidents documented	23
Children killed	45
Child share of civilian deaths	40.9%
Residential strikes	52.2%
Drone strikes	43.5%
Adults killed	65
Primary platform	Aircraft + Drone




Lebanon

Perpetrator: Israeli Defence Forces

64 children killed

Incidents documented	21
Children killed	64
Child share of civilian deaths	36.8%
Residential strikes	90.5%
Drone strikes	0%
Adults killed	110
Primary platform	Combat aircraft



Sudan

Perpetrators: RSF + SAF

149 children killed

Incidents documented	13
Children killed	149
Child share of civilian deaths	41.3%
Drone strikes	100%
Avg children per incident	11.5
Adults killed	212
Primary platform	Drone



CHAPTER 3

Conflict Actors and Child Casualties

A comparative analysis of airstrike perpetrators by incident frequency, child casualty rates, and accountability outcomes across eight conflict zones.

Smoke rises after an Israeli air strike in Gaza City Ali Hassan/Flash90

Conflict Actors and Child Casualties

A comparative analysis of airstrike perpetrators by incident frequency, child casualty rates, and accountability outcomes across eight conflict zones.

Across 88 documented airstrike incidents, **11 distinct perpetrators** were identified — ten state actors and one non-state armed group. They operated in eleven countries across four continents, deployed five categories of aerial platform, and together killed **375 children** and injured 83 others.

PERPETRATOR	TYPE	INCIDENTS	CHILDREN KILLED	TOTAL KILLED	TOTAL CASUALTIES (+ INJURED)	CHILDREN / INCIDENT	ACCOUNTABILITY
Israeli Defence Forces	State	45	111	286	323	2.5	None — select strikes 'under review'
Rapid Support Forces	Non-State	8	96	191	236	12.0	None — no investigation initiated
Sudanese Armed Forces	State	5	53	170	420	10.6	None — SAF denies civilian targeting
Military Junta (Myanmar)	State	10	37	149	261	3.7	None — media blackout
Russian Armed Forces	State	8	16	63	140	2.0	None — ICC warrant unrelated
Malian Armed Forces (FAMA)	State	4	11	24	27	2.8	None — media blackout
Pakistani Air Force	State	3	31	39	44	10.3	None — all claims disputed
U.S.-Israeli Coalition	State	2	6	11	11	3.0	None — US inquiry, no findings
Ukrainian Armed Forces	State	1	2	29	60	2.0	None — not confirmed or denied
SSPDF (South Sudan)	State	1	11	26	56	11.0	None — SSPDF denied targeting civilians
Nigerian Air Force	State	1	1 (tbc)	201	201	1.0	None — no investigation announced

Four Findings the Data Makes Impossible to Ignore

1. *A non-state actor is the most lethal perpetrator per incident.* The Rapid Support Forces — a paramilitary group under a UN arms embargo — killed 12 children per airstrike, more than double the dataset average of 4.3 and nearly five times the IDF's rate of 2.5. Across 8 incidents, the RSF killed 96 children and produced 236 total casualties. Every single RSF strike in this dataset was conducted by drone. Every one of those drones likely arrived through a documented third-party supply chain in violation of international law. The RSF is not the most lethal actor per incident because of superior tactics — it is because it was given weapons it should never have had.

2. *Total casualty figures reveal a different lethality picture.* While the RSF leads on children killed per incident, the Sudanese Armed Forces produced the highest total casualties per incident in the dataset: 84 casualties — an average including 34 killed and 50 injured per strike. This is driven by two catastrophic strikes: one on El-Daein Teaching Hospital (70 killed, 146 injured) and one on a wedding gathering in Kutum (58 killed, 50 injured). Both were drone strikes. Both targeted civilian gatherings. The SAF figure emphasises that state actors striking civilian congregations with explosive weapons can produce casualties at a scale that exceeds even the RSF's most destructive attacks.

3. *Sudan has two perpetrators, on opposite sides, both killing children.* The RSF killed 96 children across 8 incidents. The SAF killed 53 children across 5 incidents, including strikes on a hospital and a wedding. CRW documents without distinction. Both deployed drones. Both struck civilian locations. Both produced child casualties. Neither has been investigated.

4. *The IDF conducted more airstrikes resulting in the death or injury of a child than any other perpetrator in the dataset.* 45 of 88 incidents — 51.1% of the entire dataset — were attributed to the Israeli Defence Forces, operating across Lebanon, Syria and the occupied Palestinian territory. These 45 incidents killed 111 children and 175 adult civilians others across residential areas, displacement camps, commercial sites, and transport routes. CRW identified no completed, publicly available investigation acknowledging child casualties for the incidents in this subset as of the reporting cutoff.

ZERO ACCOUNTABILITY ACROSS 10 PERPETRATORS

Across all 88 incidents — 11 perpetrators, 11 conflict locations, 6 months — CRW identified no completed legal accountability outcome relating specifically to the documented incidents as of the reporting cutoff. The accountability column in the table above reads the same across every row.



CHAPTER 4

Drone Warfare: Proliferation and Civilian Harm

How a weapons technology proliferated beyond state militaries — and into the hands of actors deploying it against children.

FH-95 strategic drone downed by Sudanese Armed Forces northwest of El Obeid, North Kordofan, July 2026 · Military Africa

Drone Warfare: Proliferation and Civilian Harm

How a weapons technology proliferated beyond state militaries — and into the hands of actors deploying it against children.

Of the 88 airstrike incidents documented by Children’s Rights Watch between November 2025 and April 2026, **34 were confirmed drone strikes — representing 38.6% of all incidents**. These 34 strikes killed 187 children and 275 adults and injured nearly 400 civilians. Drone strikes were responsible for **49.9%** of all child deaths from airstrikes in the CRW reporting period, despite accounting for fewer than 39% of incidents. This association should not be interpreted as evidence that drone platforms by themselves caused the higher casualty rate; differences in target type, location, conflict context and munition also play a key role.

34	187	39%
drone strike incidents out of 88 total	children killed by drone strikes	of all airstrike incidents were drone strikes

Drone strikes also produced the single deadliest airstrike against children documented in the reporting period: the RSF attack on a kindergarten in Kagoli, North Kordofan, Sudan, in early December 2025, **which killed 63 children** and 51 adults in a single strike. No airstrike from any other platform in the six-month reporting period came close to this casualty level.

Key finding

According to the CRW Data set, drone strikes were the deadliest form of air-delivered weapon against children in the reporting period. With a child kill rate of **5.5** per incident compared to an overall airstrike average of **4.3**. Drone strikes consistently produced higher child casualty rates than other aerial platforms — a pattern most pronounced in **Sudan**, where all 13 documented airstrike incidents were conducted by drone at an average of 11.5 children killed per strike.

Drone warfare against civilians is no longer limited to specific conflicts or specific actors. CRW’s data documents drone strikes resulting in child casualties carried out by five distinct parties across five conflict zones, spanning state militaries, allied armed forces, and — for the first time in CRW’s analysis — non-state armed actors.

Perpetrator	Drone Strikes	Child Casualties	Context
Rapid Support Forces	8	96 killed	Non-state actor; Likely Chinese CH-95/FH-95 platforms; UAE-supplied via third-party re-export
Sudanese Armed Forces	5	53 killed	State actor; strikes on hospital, kindergarten, civilian transport
Israeli Defence Forces	10	17 children killed in Lebanon and Gaza	State actor; drone strikes on vehicles, roads, residential areas
Russian Armed Forces	6	8 children killed	State actor; Shahed-series and Geran-series drones used
Malian Armed Forces	4	11 children killed	State actor; mostly strikes against nomadic tribes
Ukrainian Armed Forces	1	2 children killed — Kyrylivka holiday camp, Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia	Russia confirmed, Ukraine did not deny

The distribution of drone strikes across six parties and six conflict zones reflects a broader shift in the character of contemporary armed conflict. Drone platforms — once the exclusive domain of technologically advanced state militaries — are now accessible to a widening range of actors, including non-state armed groups operating in environments with limited international oversight.

| Sudan: The Only Conflict Where Non-State Actors Deployed Drones Against Civilians

Sudan stands apart from every other conflict location in CRW’s analysis in one critical respect: it is the only conflict in this dataset where a non-state armed actor had access to and was actively deploying drone strikes against civilian locations/populations. Of the 34 confirmed drone strike incidents, 13 occurred in Sudan — representing 43.3% of all documented drone strikes globally in the reporting period. Drone strikes accounted for 100% of all airstrike incidents in Sudan in which children were killed or injured.

Both the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces deployed drone platforms against civilian locations/populations. The RSF, a non-state paramilitary force, was responsible for 8 of the 13 documented drones strikes in Sudan. The SAF, a recognised state military, was responsible for 5.

| The Supply Chain Behind Sudan's Drone War

The RSF's access to sophisticated drone platforms did not arise spontaneously. The Chinese-manufactured CH-95 and FH-95 platforms documented in CRW's research are long-endurance UAV systems. The FH-95 is publicly described as capable of reconnaissance, electronic warfare and strike missions, with evidence of carriage of laser-guided and GPS-guided munitions. Their presence in a conflict zone subject to a UN Security Council arms embargo is the result of a deliberate and documented supply chain.



6 UAVs consistent with CH-95s or FH-95s capable of long-range surveillance + strikes were detected at RSF-held Nyala Airport. Humanitarian Research Lab – Yale; Satellite Images by Maxar.

Satellite imagery analysed by Yale University's Humanitarian Research Lab identified at least 12 CH-95 and FH-95 platforms at Nyala Airport in South Darfur⁸ — an RSF-controlled facility. Battlefield recovery analysis by Amnesty International confirmed Chinese-manufactured guided munitions, including GB50A laser-guided bombs, were in RSF possession⁹. Analysis by the Sudanese Armed Forces and independent conflict

⁸ UAVs at RSF-held Nyala Airport - weapons likely consistent with CH-95s or FH-95s capable of long-range surveillance + strikes. RSF received advanced weapons systems while committing atrocities in Zamzam IDP Camp. By Humanitarian Research Lab (HRL) at YSPH on X: https://x.com/HRL_YaleSPH/status/1915894400288178592

⁹ Sudan Advanced Chinese Weaponry Provided by UAE Identified in Breach of Arms Embargo - Amnesty International. Published on 08/05/2026: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/05/sudan-advanced-chinese-weaponry-provided-by-uae-identified-in-breach-of-arms-embargo-new-investigation/>

monitors identified the United Arab Emirates as the primary re-exporter of these platforms to the RSF, with transit routes running through Chad, Ethiopia, and the Central African Republic.

The RSF's drone campaign — which killed the majority of the 187 children documented in CRW's drone strike findings — was therefore not simply the product of a local armed group's improvisation. It was made possible by the sustained supply of advanced aerial weapons technology to a non-state actor, raising serious questions concerning compliance with applicable international arms-embargo and transfer obligations.



Documented cases of Chinese-made CH-95 drones shot down by the Sudanese Armed Forces in 2025 and 2026 (Left and Top Right images); Stock picture of the CH-95 retrieved from open sources (Bottom Right)

Drones against nomads: The Mali case

In Mali, the Malian Armed Forces (FAMA) conducted four drone strikes between November 2025 and February 2026, killing eleven children across Tuareg nomadic communities in the Tombouctou and Ségou regions. Human Rights Watch confirmed no military presence at any of the strike sites¹⁰.

The specific platforms used in these strikes have not been publicly identified; however, FAMA's drone arsenal during this period drew on multiple concurrent supply lines. Turkish Bayraktar AKINCI drones were delivered to FAMA in November 2024 and February 2026¹¹, giving Mali approximately eight AKINCI airframes. Africa Corps — Russia's state-

¹⁰ *Personne Ne Pourra Sechapper*. By Human Rights Watch. Published on 04/02/2026:


<https://www.hrw.org/fr/report/2026/04/02/personne-ne-pourra-sechapper/crimes-de-guerre-et-crimes-contre-lhumanite-commis>

¹¹ *Malian Junta Receives Batch of Turkish Bayraktar AKINCI Strike Drones*. By Militarnyi. Published on 06/08/2026:

<https://militarnyi.com/en/news/mali-turkish-bayraktar-akinci-strike-drones/>

directed private military company operating alongside FAMA — deployed Garpiya-A1 drones, a Russian-produced Shahed-derived system, against targets in Mali during the same period¹².

By July 2026, Bellingcat confirmed the use of Shahed-136-type drones in strikes on Malian villages, geolocating footage to Inafarak and Talahandak¹³. The drone technology available to forces operating in Mali during the reporting period therefore includes Russian-origin loitering munitions, Turkish strike drones, and FPV systems — all in active use in a theatre where civilian communities have been repeatedly struck without accountability



Still retrieved from a video shared by Bellingcat on a drone strike in Talahandak (Left) And a picture of a Shahed-type drone flying over Kyiv during a Russian attack on Ukraine, 27 December 2025, retrieved from the Africa Report. (Right)

The Accountability Gap

Across 34 documented drone strikes killing **187** children in six conflict zones, **not a single perpetrator has faced legal accountability**. In Sudan, CRW identified no publicly documented investigation by an international body with enforcement capacity specifically addressing the RSF's documented drone strikes during the reporting period. In Ukraine, the International Criminal Court has issued arrest warrants related to the deportation of Ukrainian children but not to the drone strikes documented in this report. In Lebanon and Gaza, the IDF has characterised individual civilian casualties as “under review” without publishing findings.

The pattern is consistent: drone strikes against civilians produce child casualties, generate brief international condemnation, and are then absorbed into the ongoing casualty count without consequence. The supply chains that enable these strikes continue to operate. The platforms continue to be deployed. The children continue to die.

¹² *Africa Corps Adds Drones in Mali*. By Africa Defence Forum. Published on 30/06/2026: <https://adf-magazine.com/2026/06/africa-corps-adds-drones-in-mali/>

¹³ *Shahed-Type Drones Filmed During Mali Village Attacks*. By Bellingcat. Published on 24/07/2026: <https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2026/07/24/shahed-type-drones-filmed-during-attack-on-mali-villages/>



CHAPTER 5

Recommendations

Based on data and analysis made by Children's Rights Watch, to safeguard the lives of children and civilians in armed conflict settings.

A Palestinian child inspects the rubble of a school destroyed in an Israeli airstrike on Deir al Balah, central Gaza Strip, on Saturday. (Abdel Kareem Hana / Associated Press)

Recommendations

Based on data and analysis made by Children's Rights Watch, to safeguard the lives of children and civilians in armed conflict settings.

The data gathered by Children's Rights Watch between November 2025 and April 2026 does not describe an abstract pattern of harm. It documents 88 unique incidents in which children — with an average age of eight — were killed or injured by air-delivered explosive weapons. The findings are specific, and the recommendations that follow are grounded in them.

Across the eleven conflict locations analysed, the data reveals three recurring patterns associated with child casualties: the deliberate or reckless use of explosive weapons in populated civilian areas; the systematic failure to investigate and acknowledge civilian harm; and the unimpeded flow of aerial weapons technology to parties that deploy it against civilians. Each set of recommendations below addresses one or more of these failures directly.

To Parties to Armed Conflict

CRW data shows that 63.6% of documented airstrike incidents resulting in child casualties struck residential areas. In Lebanon, this figure reached 90.5%. In Ukraine, 88.9% of airstrikes killing or injuring children hit residential buildings. These findings raise significant questions about the adequacy of precautions taken to protect civilians in populated areas.

63.6%

of all documented airstrike incidents in this reporting period struck residential areas — the most common location type by a wide margin.

- **Stop striking residential areas with explosive weapons of wide-area effect** when the presence of civilians — particularly children — is known or reasonably foreseeable.
- Treat attacks on schools and hospitals as categorically distinct from other strikes. CRW data shows that just two documented strikes on educational facilities killed 72 children — an average of 36 child deaths per incident, more than eleven times the

average residential strike. Just two strikes on healthcare facilities killed 16 children and 89 adults. The per-incident lethality of strikes on protected sites is catastrophic.

- Implement and enforce no-strike lists that include all civilian infrastructure, displacement sites, and humanitarian facilities actively in use. CRW documented strikes on refugee camps and humanitarian support centres representing 11.9% of all incidents — a pattern that indicates these sites are not being treated as protected.
- Conduct mandatory, timely, and transparent post-strike assessments whenever a strike results in civilian casualties. In none of the ten conflict locations analysed did the responsible party conduct and publish a credible public investigation into child casualties within the reporting period. In several cases, initial denials were contradicted by subsequent evidence.

| To Governments Supplying Aerial Weapons Technology

CRW data identifies drone strikes as the primary cause of child airstrike casualties in Sudan and Mali, responsible for 100% of documented child deaths from airstrikes in those countries during the reporting period. The drone platforms responsible for these deaths were not domestically produced. They entered Sudan's conflict through deliberate third-party supply chains, in a country subject to a UN arms embargo. In Mali, they were imported from Russia, Türkiye and China.

100%

of child airstrike deaths in Sudan during this period were caused by drone strikes — all operated by parties receiving drone technology from external suppliers.

- Impose immediate end-use restrictions on drone platforms and aerial munitions exported to parties in active conflict. Governments supplying CH-95, FH-95, Bayraktar Akıncı, or equivalent platforms to conflict parties must require binding commitments that these systems will not be used against civilian populations — and must suspend supply when evidence of civilian use emerges.
- Enforce existing arms embargo obligations. The UN Security Council's arms embargo on Sudan has demonstrably failed to prevent the RSF from acquiring and deploying Chinese-manufactured drone platforms via third-party re-export

Conclusion

375 children. Eleven conflict zones. No completed legal accountability outcome relating specifically to the 88 incidents documented by CRW was identified as of the reporting cutoff.

Between November 2025 and April 2026, Children’s Rights Watch documented **88 individual airstrike incidents** resulting in the deaths of **375** children across eleven conflict zones. The average age of those children was 7.8 years old. The youngest was a newborn. The oldest was 17. They were killed in their homes, their schools, their displacement tents, and their cars, by weapons delivered from the air — by states and by armed groups, in wars that the world either watches or ignores, but almost never stops.

The locations tell the first story.

63.6% of all documented incidents struck residential areas. In Lebanon, that figure reached 90.5%. In Ukraine, 88.9%. These are not marginal findings — they are the statistical signature of explosive weapons being used routinely in places where children live. Two strikes on educational facilities killed 72 children at an average of 36 per incident, more than eleven times the residential average. A drone strike on a kindergarten in North Kordofan killed 63 children in a single attack. These findings document repeated child casualties associated with the use of air-delivered explosive weapons in populated civilian locations.

The weapons tell the second story.

Drone strikes produced a child kill rate of 5.9 per incident — significantly higher than the overall airstrike average of 4.3. Sudan, where every single documented airstrike was a drone strike, recorded the highest child casualty count of any country in the dataset: 149 children killed across 13 incidents, at an average of 11.5 children per strike. The RSF — a paramilitary group under a UN arms embargo — killed 12 children per incident, the highest rate of any perpetrator. Every RSF drone in this dataset arrived through a documented third-party supply chain, in violation of international law. The weapons did not build themselves. They were sold, transferred, and delivered. Accountability for the children killed by those drones does not end at the trigger.

The accountability record tells the third story.

Across all 88 incidents, in all eleven conflict zones, across eleven distinct perpetrators — not one has faced legal accountability. State actors deny. Non-state actors vanish. International courts move slowly. Arms continue to flow. Children continue to die. The

gap between the scale of documented harm and the scale of institutional response is not a failure of evidence. The findings highlight a substantial gap between the scale of documented harm and the publicly documented institutional response.

The 375 children documented in this report are not a statistic. They represent CRW's documented, verified minimum based on individually identified incidents and available open-source evidence. The true number is higher — limited by access, by media blackouts, by the speed of open-source reporting in active conflict zones. CRW publishes what can be proven. What cannot yet be proven is nonetheless real.

Children's Rights Watch will continue to document what is happening — one incident, one child, one verified source at a time. We do this because the record matters. Because accountability begins with facts that cannot be denied. And because the children killed in these eleven conflicts deserved, at the very least, to be remembered.



Palestinians inspect the damage in the rubble of the Al-Bashir mosque following Israeli bombardment in Deir al-Balah, central Gaza Strip, on April 2, 2024.

Below are the incidents collected and verified by CRW in 2025 and 2026 (November-April), which constituted the basis for this report:

Date	Country	Province	Location	Children Killed	Other Victims (Killed)	Location Type	Perpretrator
06/11/2025	Mali	Tombouctou Region	Aratane village	2	2	Residential	Malian Armed Forces (FAMA)
13/11/2025	Mali	Tombouctou Region	Tangatta village, commune of Tin-Aïcha	5	2	Residential	Malian Armed Forces (FAMA)
14/11/2025	Mali	Tombouctou Region	Nomadic camp, Albouhera, near Gargando	2	4	No	Malian Armed Forces (FAMA)
18/11/2025	Lebanon	Sidon	Ein El-Hilweh Camp	11	2	Humanitarian	Israeli Defence Forces
19/11/2025	Ukraine	Ternopil Oblast	Ternopil	7	31	Residential	Russian Armed Forces
20/11/2025	Palestinian Territory, Occupied	Gaza	Residential Home	1	0	Residential	Israeli Defence Forces
25/11/2025	Afghanistan	Kunar	Asadabad	9	1	Residential	Pakistani Air Force
25/11/2025	Afghanistan	Khost Province	Residential Home	9	1	Residential	Pakistani Air Force
28/11/2025	Myanmar	Arakan State	Kyaungpho	1	5	Residential	Military Junta
28/11/2025	Syria	Damascus	Village	2	0	Residential	Israeli Defence Forces
29/11/2025	Palestinian Territory, Occupied	Sidon District	School Area	2	0	Residential	Israeli Defence Forces
02/12/2025	Myanmar	Sagaing	Wetlet Township	1	4	Residential	Military Junta
03/12/2025	Palestinian Territory, Occupied	Khan Younis	Refugee Camp	2	3	Humanitarian	Israeli Defence Forces

04/12/2025	Sudan	Kordofan	Kindergarden	63	51	Education	Rapid Support Forces
10/12/2025	Myanmar	Rakhine State	Mrauk-U Hospital	1	34	Health Care	Military Junta
29/12/2025	South Sudan	Jonglei State	Lankien Town Market	11	15	Commercial	South Sudan People's Defence Forces
31/12/2025	Ukraine	Khorly	Restaurant And Hotel	2	27	Commercial	Ukrainian Armed Forces
05/01/2026	Palestinian Territory, Occupied	Khan Younis	Gaza	1	1	Residential	Israeli Defence Forces
06/01/2026	Sudan	North Kordofan State	El Obeid	7	3	Residential	Rapid Support Forces
09/01/2026	Palestinian Territory, Occupied	Southern Gaza	Gaza	3	1	Humanitarian	Israeli Defence Forces
15/01/2026	Palestinian Territory, Occupied	Gaza	Family House	1	3	Residential	Israeli Defence Forces
21/01/2026	Palestinian Territory, Occupied	Gaza	Bureij Refugee Camp	1	2	Humanitarian	Israeli Defence Forces
24/01/2026	Palestinian Territory, Occupied	Gaza	Gaza	2	0	Residential	Israeli Defence Forces
25/01/2026	Sudan	South Kordofan	Residential	1	1	Residential	Rapid Support Forces
27/01/2026	Ukraine	Odesa Oblast	Odesa	0	2	Residential	Russian Armed Forces
31/01/2026	Palestinian Territory, Occupied	Gaza	Residential Building	3	2	Residential	Israeli Defence Forces
31/01/2026	Myanmar	Sagaing Region	IDP Encampment	3	8	Humanitarian	Military Junta
04/02/2026	Palestinian Territory, Occupied	Gaza	Displacement Encampment	2	3	Humanitarian	Israeli Defence Forces
07/02/2026	Sudan	North Kordofan	World Food Program Aid Convoy	8	16	Humanitarian	Rapid Support Forces
09/02/2026	Ukraine	Kharkiv	House	1	1	Residential	Russian Armed Forces
11/02/2026	Sudan	Kordofan	Mosque	2	0	Religious	Rapid Support Forces
11/02/2026	Ukraine	Kharkiv	House	3	1	Residential	Russian Armed Forces

11/02/2026	Ukraine	Kharkiv Oblast	Residential Area	1	1	Residential	Russian Armed Forces
16/02/2026	Sudan	West Kordofan	Al Sunut IDP Shelter	15	11	Humanitarian	Sudanese Armed Forces
17/02/2026	Palestinian Territory, Occupied	North Gaza	Street	1	0	Residential	Israeli Defence Forces
17/02/2026	Mali	Ségou Region	Konokassi village cemetery, Ségou Region, Mali	2	5	No	Malian Armed Forces (FAMA)
22/02/2026	Afghanistan	Behsood	Residential Areas	13	6	Residential	Pakistani Armed Forces
24/02/2026	Myanmar	Rakhine State	Yoe Ngu Village Market	4	14	Commercial	Military Junta
24/02/2026	Myanmar	Sagaing Region	Shwekyauangan Village	2	7	Residential	Military Junta
02/03/2026	Lebanon	Nabatieh District	House	1	1	Residential	Israeli Defence Forces
04/03/2026	Lebanon	Baalbeck District	Residential Building	2	2	Residential	Israeli Defence Forces
05/03/2026	Myanmar	Sagaing's Pale Township	Yinmarbin	1	2	Residential	Military Junta
05/03/2026	Lebanon	Beqqa Valley	House	2	2	Residential	Israeli Defence Forces
06/03/2026	Lebanon	Tyre District	Residential Building	4	3	Residential	Israeli Defence Forces
06/03/2026	Palestinian Territory, Occupied	Gaza	Residential Building	6	0	Residential	Israeli Defence Forces
07/03/2026	Ukraine	Eastern Ukraine	Kharkiv	2	8	Residential	Russian Armed Forces
07/03/2026	Lebanon	Baalbek District	Shmistar	4	2	Residential	Israeli Defence Forces
10/03/2026	Ukraine	Donetsk Region	Sloviansk	1	3	Residential	Russian Armed Forces
10/03/2026	Myanmar	Karen State	Unspecified Villages	18	22	Residential	Military Junta
11/03/2026	Sudan	White Nile	Health Care Center	9	3	Education	Rapid Support Forces
12/03/2026	Sudan	West Darfur	Adikong Border Market	0	4	Commercial	Sudanese Armed Forces

12/03/2026	Lebanon	Southern Lebanon	Barashit	1	1	Residential	Israeli Defence Forces
12/03/2026	Palestinian Territory, Occupied	Gaza	House	2	2	Residential	Israeli Defence Forces
12/03/2026	Lebanon	Saida District	Residential Family Home	1	6	Residential	Israeli Defence Forces
13/03/2026	Lebanon	Nabatieh District	Residential	1	0	Residential	Israeli Defence Forces
15/03/2026	Palestinian Territory, Occupied	Gaza	Nuseirat Refugee Camp	2	9	Humanitarian	Israeli Defence Forces
15/03/2026	Palestinian Territory, Occupied	Gaza	Residential/Road	2	10	Residential	Israeli Defence Forces
18/03/2026	Palestinian Territory, Occupied	West Bank	Saloon	3	4	Commercial	Israeli Defence Forces
20/03/2026	Iran	Markazi Province	House	2	0	Residential	U.S-Israeli Coalition
25/03/2026	Sudan	North Darfur	Market	1	21	Commercial	Rapid Support Forces
27/03/2026	Sudan	East Darfur	El-Daein Hospital	15	55	Health Care	Sudanese Armed Forces
27/03/2026	Lebanon	South Lebanon	Residential Compound	1	2	Residential	Israeli Defence Forces
29/03/2026	Myanmar	Chin State	Kyaung Chaung Village	4	3	Residential	Military Junta
31/03/2026	Sudan	South Kordofan	Dilling	5	0	No	Rapid Support Forces
05/04/2026	Lebanon	Koura District	Kfarhata	1	6	Residential	Israeli Defence Forces
06/04/2026	Iran	Shahriar Province	Shahriar Province	4	5	No	U.S-Israeli Coalition
06/04/2026	Lebanon	South Lebanon	Kfar Hatta	1	6	Residential	Israeli Defence Forces
08/04/2026	Lebanon	Tyre District	Saeed Family Home	1	3	Residential	Israeli Defence Forces
08/04/2026	Lebanon	South Lebanon	Adloun	3	2	Transport	Israeli Defence Forces
08/04/2026	Lebanon	Beirut	Ay El Sellom Neighbourhood	18	62	Residential	Israeli Defence Forces

08/04/2026	Lebanon	Mount Lebanon	Residential (Family Home)	3	2	Residential	Israeli Defence Forces
08/04/2026	Lebanon	Beirut	Residential/Vehicle	1	1	Residential	Israeli Defence Forces
09/04/2026	Sudan	North Darfur	Wedding Ceremony	17	41	Religious	Sudanese Armed Forces
09/04/2026	Sudan	North Darfur	Salama Neighborhood Near Al-Um Girls' School	6	6	Residential	Sudanese Armed Forces
11/04/2026	Lebanon	Beirut	Beirut	4	1	Residential	Israeli Defence Forces
12/04/2026	Lebanon	South Lebanon	Srifa	1	3	Residential	Israeli Defence Forces
12/04/2026	Nigeria	Yobe State	Market	1	200	Commercial	Nigerian Air Force
14/04/2026	Palestinian Territory, Occupied	Gaza	Gaza	1	5	No	Israeli Defence Forces
14/04/2026	Palestinian Territory, Occupied	Gaza	Vehicle/Road	1	3	Transport	Israeli Defence Forces
15/04/2026	Lebanon	Sidon District	Ansariyeh	2	3	Residential	Israeli Defence Forces
16/04/2026	Myanmar	Sagaing Region	Kyaukka	2	13	Residential	Military Junta
19/04/2026	Ukraine	Chernihiv Oblast	Chernihiv	1	0	Residential	Russian Armed Forces
22/04/2026	Palestinian Territory, Occupied	Gaza	Beit Lahia	3	2	Residential	Israeli Defence Forces
22/04/2026	Palestinian Territory, Occupied	North Gaza	Urban/Near Mosque	3	2	No	Israeli Defence Forces
24/04/2026	Palestinian Territory, Occupied	Khan Younis	IDP Encampment	1	7	Humanitarian	Israeli Defence Forces
25/04/2026	Palestinian Territory, Occupied	Gaza	Sheikh Radwan	1	2	Residential	Israeli Defence Forces
27/04/2026	Lebanon	Nabatiyeh Governorate	Burj Qalawiya	1	0	Residential	Israeli Defence Forces
28/04/2026	Palestinian Territory, Occupied	Gaza	Eastern Khan Younis	1	4	No	Israeli Defence Forces

This report is part of an ongoing effort to document harm to children in conflict zones. If you have information about incidents affecting children in armed conflict, we want to hear from you:

contactchildrensrightswatch@gmail.com

